Introduction
The aim of this article is to examine critically the burgeoning practice of stakeholder engagement in radioactive waste management (RWM). This apparent turn away from technocratic decision making calls for closer scrutiny. In particular we focus on the way century, a change could be observed in framing the radioactive waste problem, from a technical problem, investigating possible solutions, to a controversial social problem in need of acceptance and legitimacy. 2 This seems to have led to a change in policy arrangements for regulating, planning and implementing RWM. Particularly with regard to siting repository facilities, we have witnessed across the European Union (EU) a shift from a purely technical approach to one that includes stakeholders and the public in the decision making process and aims to integrate, to a bigger or lesser extent, the technical with the social. These initiatives must be seen as responses to public criticism of existing top-down approaches and what could be called risks are involved -therefore becomes fundamental to any analysis of participatory processes. Rather than simply greeting developments involving greater participation as examples of 'good practice', therefore, we need to examine carefully how issues are framed and identified by the actors involved, and what connections between the social and technological aspects of the problem are deliberated upon. We therefore agree that there is need for more sceptical and critical examination of the 'new' mode of governance, rather than a naïve defence of the participatory turn (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Irwin 2006; Collins and Evans 2007, Kaiser 2012) , a stance which is endorsed by reports of disillusionment with participation and the emergence of 'participation fatigue' in some of the cases analysed here (e.g. Polič, Kos, and Železnick 2006) .
In this paper, we will therefore examine more closely what exactly is taking place within these new configurations in RWM, not merely in terms of the social processes of participation and decision making, but also crucially in terms of how these processes mediate the relationship between the social and technical aspects of the problem. While a participatory turn in RWM would appear to be making steady progress, and recognition of the importance of social aspects of RWM in the EU is practically universal (see e.g. NEA 2010), one cannot but notice that the long-standing consensus within the international community of nuclear experts on geological isolation being the best available technique and the only solution that can be envisaged for disposing of any type of high-level and long-lived waste has survived the change of management procedures. Various authors have therefore argued that many of these participatory initiatives are mainly driven by a need to secure legitimacy and increase In order to take the next step we therefore need to present some ideas on how to understand sociotechnical combinations.
Sociotechnical combinations: separation and integration
Governing any technology, particularly controversial technology such as nuclear power, is a task that is simultaneously technical and social. While often presented as purely technical, in these processes we never find 'pure' technical or 'pure' social factors. We should therefore look at these processes and technologies as hybrid 'sociotechnical combinations' (Latour 1993).
In actor-network theory (ANT), one of the liveliest theoretical traditions within the academic field of science and technology studies (STS), the ambition is to dissolve, or at least be agnostic to, the separation between technical and social aspects. Therefore, ANT studies sociotechnical combinations in the making, addressing social and technical factors as entangled in a development process where no one has priority (Callon 2009).
What is usually called technological innovation also includes innovation of identities, social roles, decision making processes, and institutions that are adapted to the technological object. What goes on in such an innovation process is mutual adaptation between many factors gathered together in one and the same process. But why is it so difficult to overcome the urge for separation, just as much for social scientists studying participatory processes, as it is for scientists and engineers discussing 'their' technological projects in public? Latour (1993) is no separation without integration. Nevertheless, as already noted, separation is a common strategy used by actors in a modern society in order to present their activities as having clear boundaries and as being independent of extraneous influences.
The frame of integration presents the social and technical aspects as being coproduced, i.e. that they are shaping each other through an interdependent process. Such co-production means that social aspects influence technical projects, while a technical project simultaneously supports and justifies the corresponding social project.
Developing a technical project also means shaping society ( Separation may not even be intrinsically problematic if there is acknowledgement that it is a simplification and awareness of the more complex entanglements existing behind it.
On the other hand, for integration to be more than a rhetorical framing by powerful
Final pre-proof version -to be published In the following two sections we will address in more detail how social aspects are framed and understood, and how they are related to the technical aspects in national activities dealing with radioactive waste, by examining approaches to governance in Belgium, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and the ways in which participation and the prevalent sociotechnical divide figure in these approaches.
In doing this we will use the notions of separation and integration as two different ways of framing the complex and entangled relationships between the technical and the social. We will follow in the footsteps of the actors in the four countries to see how they deal with the relationship, to see the specific configurations that result, and to explore the variations in how these sociotechnical combinations are constructed, understood and presented.
Sociotechnical combinations: four national examples
After the failure of a technocratic top-down approach, which happened at different times in the four countries described below, it looked as if consensus emerged around the shortcomings of a technically-driven siting process. Both implementers and opinion groups apparently agreed that the agencies responsible had been focused only on technical issues and had not paid enough attention to social aspects. Therefore, programmes were reset on a new 'participatory' basis, with due attention paid to
Final pre-proof version -to be published Before describing these four cases, it would be appropriate to outline the reasons that they were chosen as the focus of the research and of the analysis presented here. Firstly, there was what we might call a criterion of similarity: all of these countries shared the essential characteristic of having seen a marked participatory turn in radioactive waste management policy, developing an approach to siting that gave communities a voice in the process but that also came to focus on communities hosting existing nuclear facilities. Secondly, a criterion of diversity: in each country there were significant differences in the national context, in the way that participation took place and in the ways that the prevalent divide between the treatment of the social and the technical was dealt with. The process in each of these countries has also at some time been viewed from outside as being in some respect exemplary. The additional fact that they have all Turning now to our cases, we start in Sweden, where the shift from technocracy to a more inclusive strategy in radioactive waste management first took place.
Sweden
Based on the key word of voluntarism, the new mechanism for integrating social and At the time -and even today -the repository for HLW was not yet considered. There are governmental documents dealing with this problem but no real activities. The reason for this is that national disposal of the relatively small quantity of HLW produced in Slovenia is not considered rational. This attitude could be summarized as: HLW is "too big a problem to fail", while Slovenian HLW production is "too small to act".
Final pre-proof version -to be published After some rounds of negotiations between municipalities, responding to a siting bid, and ARAO, the number of potential hosts shrank from ten to three. Later only two localities remained in the game -two municipalities which for more than twenty years have been hosting Slovenia's only nuclear power plant. consequence some of the most affected groups were marginalised. Moreover, the compensation anticipated for the local community hosting the repository gave rise to new tensions. A substantial part of the lay public remained uninformed, while technical experts remained largely unmoved by the attempt to reframe radioactive waste as a sociotechnical issue. As soon as the location for the repository was formally selected, the partnership in Krško was shut down and the idea that lay groups are not competent to participate in the decision making process revived (Kos, Polič and Železnik 2011)
The final outcome of the Slovenian partnership was thus a not-particularly-harmonious or trusting relationship between affected actors, one that did not break out of the frame of a strong social and technical divide.
Belgium
In contingent and, as noted by Rip (2010), precarious; they will also likely present, as did our examples above, critical issues that will need to be addressed; all of which is an argument for fostering an awareness of the entangled nature of the issues and its consequences in order that the risk of lock-in or of some unintended and inflexible form of path dependency is reduced. This is not then a simple or a simplistic recipe; in fact not a recipe at all but a theoretically-based, empirically-grounded proposal for an approach to the task of developing what has been referred to as technical democracy (Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe 2009) in the long-term management of radioactive waste.
